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In this paper, the welfare results in trade liberalisation scenarios in global CGE models (like GTAP) 
are analysed. The default modeling strategy in trade is the Armington assumption with bilateral trade 
flows in industries. The negative terms of trade effects that often dominate the negative welfare 
outcome in simulation experiments are decomposed to imports and exports price effects. The 
numerical examples show that even in unilateral liberalisation with decreasing import tariffs, the 
welfare effects are dominated by domestic price level changes that also drive the exports prices. The 
numerical examples are built around simple GTAP tariff cut experiments with 3x3 country and 
commodity aggregation. The inherent feature in this type of models is that they support arguments for 
unilateral market access, like preferences, at the expense of multilateral trade liberalisation.  
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1.  Introduction  
 
In assessing the world market impacts of multilateral trade reforms, nearly all the global general 
equilibrium models today draw on the global production, use, and trade database collected and 
maintained by Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) (Hertel and Ivanic (2006). 
 
One essential feature of the database that also guides the modelling solutions, are the bilateral trade 
flows by industries.  This means that both imports and exports in each industry are tracked by source 
or destination. In trade statistics each industry is composed of several distinct products making this 
two-way trade possible. According to Francois and Reinert (1997), applied trade policy analysis 
prefers model structures utilising accurate and current data at the expense of more consistent 
theoretical frameworks, whenever that trade data is available. 
 
The modelling solutions based on Armington structure have their impact on the effects of welfare 
impacts from trade liberalisation. In this study those effects and arguments used in explaining the 
results are discussed. Especially, the negative welfare effects for many developing countries in the 
trade liberalisation have raised this interest.  
 
The negative welfare effects in trade liberalisation are shown to be due to the cross-substitution of 
domestic and imported commodities. The decreasing price of imported commodities reduce the price 
of domestic commodity. If this commodity is further exported, its decreasing price causes a decrease 
in the price of exportables, terms of trade and welfare, respectively. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, the welfare changes from trade liberalisation are analysed 
starting from the general approach in the form of expenditure function and decomposing the effect of 
tariff changes. After that, we introduce the Armington structure and how it has been applied in 
modelling trade in GTAP model. Next we take a numerical example of GTAP simulations to describe 
the decomposed effect of trade liberalisation. Finally, we discuss the implications that this modelling 
approach has in the arena of trade liberalisation discussion.  
  
2.  Approximating welfare changes arising from a change in trade policy 
 
Assume there are N goods, each good is produced domestically and also imported. Part of the 
production is exported. World prices are denoted by vector pw= (pw1,…pwN),  and the vectors of 
domestic and imported prices as pd = (pd1, …, pdN) and pm =  (pm1,…, pmN), respectively. 
Assume also that the behaviour of economies with existing distortions can be presented by maximised 
value functions where the following identity between expenditures and incomes holds: 
 
 (1.1) S(pd,pm,pw,u0) ≡ G(pd) + ∑(pmi-pwi)mi 
 
S are the expenditures with a given utility including the imported commodities as well. The income 
consists of production (G(pd)), given by the economy’s revenue or GDP function (part of which is 
exported with domestic price pd) and the tariff revenue where τ= pmi-pwi is the tariff rate and mi is 
imports. 
 
Money metric welfare change, called equivalent variation, measures the expenditures in the new 
situation after a policy implementation compared to the original expenditures and is defined as  
 
(1.2.)   EV = S(pd,pm,pw,u1) - S(pd,pm,pw,u0) 
A local approximation of the welfare change can be derived by assuming the expenditures in the new 
situation to equal with income 
1 
 
(1.3.)   EV =(G(pd) + ∑(pmi-pwi)mi) - S(pd,pm,pw,u0) = 0 
 
Holding utility constant (du0= 0), the equation can be totally differentiated  




















By the properties of the revenue and expenditure functions we have ∂G/∂pdi = qi, the supply of the 
commodity i, ∂S/∂pdi = di, the demand for domestic commodity  i and ∂S/∂pmi=mi is the demand for 
imports. Including these to the previous equation we get 





where qi-di measures exports, domestic production minus consumption and the dpdi is the change in the 
price of the domestic commodity. The first term in brackets measures the sum in terms of trade change 
when both exports and imports are taken into account. The last effect is the trade volume effect which 
                                                 
1 Adapted from Bowen et al. (1998), p. 197. measures the change in tariff revenue when volume of imports changes. The last term can be thought 
to describe the general deadweight loss due tariffs.
2 
To make the case even more comparable with GTAP results, the equation can be divided by d τ and 
recognise the substitutability of domestic commodity with imported one ∂pdi/∂pmi<0.  
 




[(qi-di)dpdi/dpmi(dpmi/d τ ) - midpwi/d τ +(pmi-pwi)dmi/d τ] 
 
The effect of tariff changes to welfare can be decomposed to exports market effect, the effect of the 
tariff to world market prices and the allocative effect through increased imports (in tariff decreasing 
case). The last effect is usually positive as increased, cheaper imports improves efficiency when 
replacing the domestic production with distortions.  
 
2.  Modelling bilateral trade with nested CES-functions 
 
The default modelling strategy for bilateral trade flows in competitive trade models is to assume an 
Armington type import demand, where domestically produced and imported commodities are 
imperfect substitutes with each other sourced by their origin (Armington 1969) The common 
assumption also treats imported varieties as substitutes with each other. Import demand is a two-stage 
nested CES-function. The widespread use of CES-functions in this type of analysis is partly due to 
their limited need of information on elasticities. The aggregation of industries is also possible with a 
CES-function.   
 
GTAP modelling of trade. 
 
Differences in modelling Armington type trade can be characterised whether the Armington 
aggregation is specific to each agent within a region or instead is simply performed at the border. 
(Hertel et al. 1997). In GTAP Model the composite imports is tracked for every agent 
(producers, consumers, government).  
 
The producer behaviour is a two-nested CES-function where the upper-level part of the function 
combines primary inputs with intermediate inputs with fixed coefficients. The value added nest itself 
is a CES-function with same elasticities among all factors of production. The intermediate inputs are 
formed of domestic products and imported composite and imported composite is further a composite 
of products imported from different simulations. The base data defines the original shares that in 
simulations adjust to new prices finding the magnitude of changes from the parameters. 
 
                                                 
2 Graphical exposition in a one commodity case, see Bowen et al, figure 5.3.  
Figure 2.1: The production technology tree in the GTAP model  
Source: Adapted from Hertel and Tsigas (1997, p.56).  
 
3. Transmission of tariff cuts to terms of trade  
 
The effect of tariffs on world market prices (middle effect in 1.6) measures how much of the tariff 
changes passes through to world market prices. In homogenous goods models, the small country takes 
world market prices as given, but the large country can pass some of the tariff increase to decreasing 
world market price, implying positive optimal tariffs for a large country. As has been noted by Gros 
(1987), Panagariya (2000) and is well known, the Armington type of models imply positive market 
power for all exporters. Increasing exports through tariff cuts implies positive terms of trade gains 
even for small countries.  
 
This argument is commonly used in explaining the negative negative welfare effects due to trade 
liberalisation and is stated for example in Hertel and Ivanic (2006) p. 59. It claims reason behind this 
outcome to be the relatively high optimal tariffs even for small economies. Reducing tariffs below 
their optimal levels would lead to negative welfare effects.  
 
Armington structure and the form of composite imports, creates an import supply function which is 
flat instead of steep. An infinitely elastic import demand reflects a situation where tariff reductions do 
not pass through to international prices, implying the optimal tariff argument does not hold. The 
general approach namely thinks the properties of tariff to be optimal at the tariff setter’s viewpoint. 
 
Instead, the negative welfare effects in trade liberalisation are due to the cross-substitution of domestic 
and imported commodities. The decreasing price of imported commodities reduce the price of domestic commodity. If this commodity is further exported, its decreasing price causes a decrease in 
the price of exportables, terms of trade and welfare, respectively. 
 
Armington structure implies export demand function for every trading country to be elastic. The 
import supply curve that responds to changes in tariffs is still flat, for each of the country. This note 
has been raised explicitly at least in Horridge and Zhai (2005). This explains why the imports prices 
do not respond to the tariff cuts when exports prices in exporting countries simultaneously do. 
 
4. Numerical example 
 
To show these effects with a numerical example we use a 3x3 aggregation with three countries 
(EU,Mozambique,Row) and three commodities (Food,Manufactures,Services) and analyse a case of 
10 percent tariff cut in the power of tariff for food exported from EU to Mozambique. As such, it is a 
unilateral trade liberalisation by Mozambique.  
 
The example here resembles a lot the GTAP book’s first example (Hertel 1997), where EU 
unilaterally reduces the tariffs for imports by 10 %. In that example countries are aggregated 
to EU, USA and ROW. Commodity aggregation is the same as here.  All the results are 
analogous and about the same magnitude. The only difference and the mutual gains in the 
book example come from the positive allocation effects. The terms of trade effects are of 
same magnitude.  For comparison, we also report the results for GTAP book example. In the base 
data the size of this bilateral tariff for imports of food from EU to Mozambique is 30 %. In the latter 
case, the tariff for imports from USA to EU is 36.9 %. 
 
Table 4.1. Decomposed Welfare and terms of trade effects from unilateral trade liberalisation 
 
Aggregation with EU Moz and ROW
Welfare, in MIO USD, 10 cut in Moz 








trade Moz 1 pworld 2 pexport 3 pimport Total
1 EU -0,48 1,03 0 0,55 1 Food 0 -0,18 0 -0,18
2 Mozambique 0,41 -0,52 -0,03 -0,14 2 Mnfcs 0 -0,14 0 -0,14
3 ROW 0,01 -0,51 0,04 -0,46 3 Svces 0 -0,19 0 -0,19
Total -0,05 0 0 -0,05 Total 0 -0,52 0 -0,52
3x3 Book example
Welfare, in MIO USD, 10 cut in EU 








trade EU 1 pworld 2 pexport 3 pimport Total
1 USA -7,21 659,43 34,98 687,2 1 food 0,86 -49,44 -6,32 -54,91
2 EU 881,23 -406,76 -21,23 453,2 2 mnfcs -0,14 -185,41 -41,04 -226,6
3 ROW -102,66 -252,67 -13,75 -369,1 3 svces 0,78 -100,02 -26,01 -125,26
Total 771,4 0 0 771,4 Total 1,5 -334,88 -73,38 -406,76 
 
The tables on the left report the welfare results (EV measured in Millions of USD) decomposed to 
allocative effect, terms of trade effect and investment effect. The last effect is borne from the 
behaviour of global savings closure and we ignore it here. The positive allocative effects are borne 
from increasing imports that replaces domestic production and are positive for liberalising countries in 
both cases. The terms of trade effects are also negative in both cases. The further decomposition of the 
terms of trade effects to world market prices (pworld), export prices (pexport) and imports prices 
(pimport) reveals that in both cases, the negative effects are bourne on exports effects (Terms of trade 
–decomposition developed by Robert McDougall, see the Model code of GTAP). Mozambique is so 
small country that its imports has no effect on export price of EU, neither on world market prices. Instead EU, is so big player, that it’s unilateral liberalisation has power on both imports prices as well 
as world market prices (Price changes are reported as changes in Millions of USD in values, for 
comparison). Still, in both cases the cross-substitution effect on imports prices to export prices 





The changes in terms of trade for a liberalising country through its exports prices, not imports prices, 
raises a question of the role of the aggregation played here. The aggregation has an impact to the 
substitution structure within one economy. Let us think of a EU is importing oranges and exporting 
wheat. If it decreases the tariff for wheat, how does this affect on the price of wheat. If goods are 
disaggregated, the effect comes through demand. But if they are aggregated, the effect comes apart 
from demand but also from the production and the import composites of different actors. Increasing 
demand decreases the price of domestic composite and exports, thus the price of wheat.  
 
The real effect on outcome on trade liberalisation is due to determination of factor prices and how they 
are determined. In Davis (1996), the factor prices depend only on exports prices, not on the prices of 
importables. These effects drive the welfare effects of trade liberalisation. 
 
The more clear conclusion of the Armington structure raises from the policy implications it entails. 
Unilateral market access is the most beneficial policy to any country in the model. Vice versa, 
increasing imports is always harmful in the terms of trade sense. Imports is beneficial only in cases 
where it replaces production with large distortions, like in the EU. In the appendix the exact 
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